Chapter 7
One of the reasons the administration supported the concept of a “campus radio station” grew out of concerns about maintaining control amid an atmosphere of enthusiastic student activism. By the late 1960′s there were more students than ever at SIU. Many were assertive and ambitious about blazing new trails and rejecting old boundaries. There is a parallel between the macro group of students generally, who questioned university and national policies, and the micro group who saw unmet student needs and wanted broadcast experience. Both groups intimidated administrators and others. As discussed in earlier chapters, Buren C. Robbins and the Broadcast Service were intimidated by the early efforts to start a student station, and President Morris was intimidated by the 1966 efforts to protest student expulsions. The apparent arson of Old Main and the Ag Building bombing were intimidating. Compared to this extreme, the prospect of a radio station run by a guy like Jerry may have seemed more acceptable.
When assertive students sought change, the likelihood of success was greater hen students acted in groups. There was an inkling of this in 1966. While few student participants from the 1966 riots were still in Carbondale in April, 1970, administrators who were there in 1966, led by still-president Delyte Morris, were not only present but still in charge. It is doubtful that WIDB could have successfully started without President Morris’ approval. It is presumed that Morris was frustrated by the ineffective efforts to communicate with the students as a whole in 1966. At that time, there was only the Daily Egyptian and WSIU-FM. One reason that efforts to create a student radio station were discouraged was that it was understood that a student radio station could be very powerful when students acted in a group and the radio station transmitted a singular student voice. Who would control this, and for what purpose would this power be used?
To avoid valid student criticism, some administrators continued to deny that critics of the administration spoke for any number of students. The apparent official attitude was that almost all students WANTED the administrators and other officials to exercise all the power and make all the decisions. Only a few “lunatic fringe” students, joined with “outside agitators” were critical. If these could only be removed (and the end justified the means) then everyone would be happy. This attitude may have been partially true about certain issues and extreme actions. Believing it to be true about all dissent leads to a closed door against reasonable protests and demands. It became more difficult to maintain the attitude that only a small minority “lunatic fringe” of students were disgruntled, when hundreds of students took to the streets in 1966.
But after a few years, memories faded, and administrators began to believe their “own” propaganda. While the numbers of students in the streets in 1966 could not be denied, it was rationalized that large numbers of students were aroused not by acts of the administration, but were inflamed by misinformation propagated by the lunatic fringe/outside agitators. Under this rationalization, almost all students, in their “regular state,” either didn’t care or supported the administration. Thus, when Jerry told the administration in 1968 and 1969 that the new radio station would seek input from all sides, including the administration, the administration heard something that resonated with their rationalization. Also, to the administration, it appeared that there were several powerful student groups behind Jerry’s effort. Jerry knew that, as long as students maintained their will power, passion and energy, the students would remain in control. Administrators believed that Jerry’s efforts, if successful, would, at worst, supply a middle-of-the-road channel of communication to students to counter the efforts of the so-called lunatic fringe.
In some respects, the administration attitude in 1970 was far from reality. From the beginning, Jerry had devoted significant efforts to supporting a station goal of supplying information to students. Jerry knew that this was the key to serving an important student need. Yet organizational enthusiasm was generated more for music programming. It was important to attract staff members, as well as listeners. It was important to establish WIDB as an integral fixture of campus life in the short time between sign on (April 12) and the end of the quarter (early June). It was generally felt that music programming was most important in reaching this goal. News and information were important, but (it was felt by staff members) these would be developed on an ongoing basis; few students would be motivated to tune in WIDB to receive news and information. This attitude and the administration’s attitudes would prove very, very wrong before WIDB was one month old.
The priority on music programming led to little attention being paid to the development of a News Department before WIDB’s sign on. While “jocks” were selected only after a rigorous audition and training process, news people were just auditioned and not trained. Where there was an extensive program format on paper, almost nothing was codified for news. There was no equipment or production studio for news people to use, and no real leader of the news department. While Tony Noce was named the first News director, he graduated in 1969. When Nick Cipriani had agreed to replace Tony as news director, it was with the understanding that Nick’s time at the station would be limited.
In the first days of WIDB after sign on, news was called for by the format for five minutes each hour. Often no one would show up to do news. When this happened, the “jock” was supposed to do it himself. Generally this ranged from a disaster to a joke. The jock was not trained for news and usually did not have the skill to do it. The jock usually had his hands full trying to be a jock (remember, it WAS the first few days and many jocks had little experience); and the jock had little time to prepare for news. Stories were often read out of newspapers or stale UPI copy from somewhere else was read cold. The result was that news was embarrassing, and most staff members cringed when it was news time.
Except for the preoccupation with establishing the station through music programming, it seems unusual in hindsight that news was not an early priority. While there have always been segments of WIDB’s target audience uninterested in news and information programming, 1970 might have been a peak year for student interest in news. There was an extremely high interest by SIU students in world and national affairs in 1970. Students’ lives, and those of their friends, were directly impacted by the draft, draft lottery, and the war. Even as one chose to distance oneself from these ongoing events, it became increasingly difficult. These events were often lead stories on newscasts, and on the front page of newspapers. A number of one’s friends, classmates, acquaintances, even parents and professors might discuss these things every day.
This general arousal spread to other areas, such as environmental concerns. April, 1970 marked the first Earth Day. Based on a review of the Southern Illinoisians, Daily Egyptians, and other sources such as H. P. Kloplowicz’s book Carbondale After Dark, there were a number of activities, events, and student groups centered around discussion or protest of the war, draft, foreign policy, government abuses, changing the system. SIU Student Government funded Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the Southern Illinois Peace Committee. Student Government itself had been active, aggressive, and relatively powerful. It demanded, and received, some expanded student rights from the administration. One was elimination of “women’s hours” in dorms. (Until then all women had to be in dorms after dark so they could be locked away from the temptations of the world). In January, 1970, Student Government brought Abbie Hoffman to speak on the war.
The University had received a federal grant to establish a “Vietnamese Studies Center.” The ostensible purpose was to educate personnel in techniques useful for advancing American interests in vietnam. Rumors abounded that these centered around techniques of torture, intimidation, and propaganda. Why was the University supporting this? The University also maintained an ROTC program at Wheeler Hall. This unquestioningly was to recruit students to participate in furthering the American military’s goals. Many students, professors, and other citizens opposed these goals. They questioned why the University was choosing to support activities regarded as immoral and harmful.
Because of the draft, those of student age were most directly affected by the war. Yet, for many reasons, the opposition to the war cut across many social and economic stratas. There was a great sense of moral outrage that bound religious groups with housewives, and Black Panthers and intellectuals, such as professors. Conservatives also opposed the war because they favored an all out effort to win, or nothing. Vietnam veterans against the war staged a memorable demonstration on the lawn of the White House, where they flung the medals they were awarded for “valor” in Vietnam at the White House in disgust.
Depending on your poll of choice, by 1970, at least half the country opposed the war, for various reasons. It was painfully obvious that the opposition was far more broad based than a mere isolated student lunatic fringe. The war had split the country, right down the middle. Attitudes began to emerge that those who did not actively oppose the war were supporters, and the only way to stop the war was to disable, or reorient supporting institutions such as the University. For example, if the University was forced to withdraw from the ROTC and Vietnamese Studies Center, it was thought that this would hasten the end of the war. More and more, there was an attitude that each person had a duty to stand up for what he or she believed.
Naturally, the University administration was slow to respond. There were significant financial consequences for withdrawing in mid-fiscal year from a grant program such as the Vietnamese Studies Center. Many administrators looked upon ROTC as a tradition of college life, hardly subject to arbitrary cancellation upon a few student’s whims. There were also some background considerations. Every year, the University had to get its budget approved by the legislature in Springfield. Many legislators were veterans. The legislature was more conservative than student interests. Legislators were far from being able to directly observe events at the front of opinion. Many agreed with the opinion that the antiwar movement was exaggerated, and punishing a few misbehaving students and a few others would solve the problem. The point is that the legislature’s general attitude was that the university should punish, not compromise with, protesting students. If University administrators were perceived as “weak” by working with student leaders, then the legislators might be displeased, and seek removal of the administrators along with reduction ofthe University’s budget and power. The battle lines had been drawn and WIDB, the new WIDB, would be at the focal point.
In January, February and April, there were demonstrations protesting ROTC and the Vietnamese Studies Center. Police made arrests. Student Government’s annual elections were set for April 29, 1970. Seven candidates were running for president. At least one advocated harsh treatment for students seeking to disrupt the university. Most of the votes supported candidates who were considered “radical,” which, at the time, roughly translated into being in favor of changes in institutions, such as the university, government and legal system, and more power to shift to the “have-nots,” such as minorities and students. Even though most voters supported radical candidates, a definitely non-radical candidate, Tom Scherschell, won with only 28% of the vote. The radicals had been shut out of student government, mainly because there too many radical candidates and the vote had split. Where student government had been an effective vehicle for radical energies, frustration, and aggression, there was now a bit of desperation.
On Friday, May 1, 1970, President Richard Nixon announced the escalation of the war and the invasion of Cambodia. A crowd gathered near Spud-Nuts, at Freeman and Illinois, blocked the street, started a fire, began drinking and smoking. State Police waded into the crowd, arrested 16, and broke it up. Nothing exciting happened over the weekend, but on Monday, May 4, at Kent State University in Ohio, a crowd of students congregated. Some were there to protest, some were there just to see what was happening, others were just there by accident. National Guard troops, some of whom were in the reserves to avoid the draft, were issued live ammunition and stationed on campus. Some objects were thrown at the soldiers. When the students failed to obey a poorly amplified order to disburse, the soldiers opened fire on the crowd of unarmed students. Four students were killed. Many others were struck by bullets and seriously injured. Dozens of others were injured in the resulting stampede. News traveled like lightning.
From today’s perspective, it is hard to imagine the voltage of the shock that hit so many of us at once and the tremendous effect. Half the country was against the war, so there was identification (to some extent) with protesting students. But this identification was far from monolithic, active support. At SIU, thousands of students had voted on Wednesday, April 29 for radical candidates, but only 150 came out to protest Nixon’s war escalation two days later. Martin Luther King Jr. turned sympathizers into active supporters when he demonstrated for voting rights in Selma, Alabama and the local sheriff attacked with fire hoses and guard dogs. Watching the demonstration and response on national TV news, viewers wondered “what did Dr. King and his group do to deserve such treatment?” The answer was that they marched for the right to vote. It was just not acceptable that people were attacked just because they peacefully marched for the right to vote.
What happened at Kent State pushed thousands over the edge. It was felt by many that a reasonable protest had led to an excessive and criminal response. Many who had sympathized, but not participated in the antiwar movement were now convinced that the government/establishment had lost the desire and/or ability to restrain and control its policing function, and was behaving more like a fascist state. Soldiers killed students merely because they were near a group that congregated to protest the war. Among the movements, there had always been debates about aggressive and passive resistance. It had been argued that Dr. King’s nonviolent tactics led to arrests and some injuries, but avoided the direct use of deadly force by authorities, and gained sympathy and support. Kent State broke this debate because mostly nonviolent protesters were shot and killed. No longer did nonviolence provide any guarantees. There was a major sense of outrage that dissenters had been shot as an official government action. It fanned the flames when conservative figures suggested that if the students had attended their classes and not looked for trouble, they would not have been shot.
The implied message (whether intended or not) was that students who attempted to participate in the democratic process were looking for trouble and deserved to be shot. All of this unified and galvanized huge numbers of previously fragmented student interests. Five days after the student government election where the winner had only 28% of the vote, on Monday, May 4, 1970, the Student Senate met in emergency session, and unanimously voted to join a national student strike in which every university in the country was to be shut down. Over 400 students attended the meeting.
In ten days this is what happened (based on DE and Southern Illinoisan reports):
Monday (5/4/70): Students shot at Kent State; SIU Student Senate votes unanamously to join national strike; Class boycott scheduled to start Wednesday (5/6).
Tuesday (5/5): 2,000 students gather at Morris Library, discuss response to Kent State shootings and Cambodian invasion; Peaceful protests and armed violence discussed; Administration announces official three-day “mourning period” (but classes were officially cancelled for only one day, Thursday).
Wednesday (5/6): Over 3,000 rally at noon at Morris Library, seek to extend official class suspension, crowd moves to Lawson, Wham, disrupting classes, pulling fire alarms, trying to get students out of class to join crowd; Crowd (2-3,000) moves to Woody Hall; many break windows, occupy offices, overturn files. Crowd moves to Wheeler Hall (where ROTC was), breaks windows, occupies offices, makes demands to shut down ROTC and Vietnamese Studies Center. Meanwhile, another 1,000 march downtown and back to Woody, still occupied by students. Police clear Woody and Wheeler; dozens are injured, including 28 police officers. State police and National Guard are called in.
Thursday (5/7): 6pm peaceful rally at Morris Library; Open mike discussion of peaceful protests vs. violence; Thousands move downtown; 150 occupy RR tracks; State police and army troops attack entire crowd with tear gas; Crowd breaks store windows, confronts troops; Some dorms tear gassed.
Friday (5/8): Martial law declared; Assembling in groups banned; No one allowed outside from 7:30 pm-6am: violators to be arrested; 700 troops arrive; 400 rally at Morris Library, broken up by police; Soldiers, in combat uniforms with rifles and bayonets, guard dorms, preventing students from joining any protests.
Saturday (5/9): Police, reportedly without warrant, remove badges and attack house at 508 Bridge Street; Occupants were watching TV, were tear gassed and beaten, charges against them dropped; Police trashed house.
Sunday/Monday (5/10-11): Groups of students form, police and troops attack with tear gas, in many dorm, campus, and C’dale areas.
Tuesday (5/12): Troops and state police withdrawn; 6pm, 1,000 gather at Morris Library, in defiance of martial law; 7 pm, crowd swells to 2,500; Marches to east campus; Swells to 5,000; Moves downtown; Moves to President Morris’ house; Some enter house.
Tuesday (12): President Morris 10 am: “Under no circumstances would the school be closed;” President Morris 11:30 pm: “The University is closed indefinitely.”
Wednesday (5/13): 12 am: Crowd moves downtown to celebrate. Huge street party; More than 5,000 people; Police ineffective; 12:30 am: Mayor closes bars; 4 am: Party over.
Thursday (5/14): Referendum held on whether university should remain closed; Turnout heavy; Closure prevails 2-1.
Friday (5/15): SIU Board of Trustees convenes in Edwardsville; Governor Richard B. Olgilvie attends record five-hour executive session; Decision to keep school closed; Dorms close that day; Classes end for quarter (four weeks early).
The basic summary is, as H. B. Koplowitz observes in his book “Carbondale After Dark:”
“Vietnam, neo-colonialism, the military-industrial complex, and all the rest of the rhetoric had been completely overshadowed by the more immediate issues of police violence and martial law.”
The hard-liners on the administration side had their way initially; they obtained more police and troops to punish student offenders (whose crimes were “unlawful assembly,” “violating curfew” or “disorderly conduct”) and force the students to obey the law. The hard-liners ignored the 1966 lessons; the results were much worse this time. Troops with weapons surrounded dorms, and gangs of police gassed dorms and attacked students. The actions of the police and troops became the more immediate “fuel” (but not the only fuel) for escalating defiance. More defiance led to more aggressive police action, and the cycle was on.
Many felt that generally reasonable conduct by students led to generally excessive and violent conduct by troops and police. Those who felt this way had little faith that the justice system would be interested in police excesses. As the cycle continued, people began to realize that anyone could be in physical danger by being in the wrong place at the right time. That’s what had happened at Kent State. At SIU, some students were gassed and beaten while they were trying to go to class, or just trying to go home. Tear gas canisters came crashing through windows into student’s dorm rooms in some cases. Some classes proceeded during daytime hours, and dangers surfaced towards nightfall. When a class would end no one knew what they would find outside the door. One might see a couple embracing under a shade tree on campus, and find clouds of tear gas a block away.
Ever practical, President Morris must have realized that the police conduct was the only part of the escalating cycle he could control. He also knew that as long as the police, troops, and students were locked together in that cycle, the university could not operate. So, at his order, the state police and troops were withdrawn. The next move was up to those who sought to disrupt the operation of the university. The protesting students persisted. It was painfully obvious that the protesters had the power to disrupt the university and the heavy presence of police and troops merely served to enhance the disruption. Either way, the university could not operate. The administration had to relent and negotiate with the protesters, who demanded the university close.
It is astounding to observe the parallels to 1966. The initial issue in 1966 was rescinding the student suspensions. When students protested, it was the extreme administration and police response (expulsion and mass arrests) that fueled the uprising that ended in army vehicles burning as a backdrop to the final confrontation at the president’s house. President Morris realized that the students had the power and continued efforts to punish them would be ineffective and only make things worse. He had to negotiate with the students. Less than four years later, the initial issue was an appropriate response to the war and Kent State. When the students protested in a nonviolent manner, it was the authoritarian effort to punish them (arrests, tear gas, beatings) that led to greater disruptions, culminating in the final confrontation at the president’s house. President Morris again realized that the students had the power and continued efforts to punish them would be ineffective and only make things worse. He had to negotiate.
Even 30 years later, this is heavy stuff. Though there were 5,000 or more participating in some of these events, there were 10-15,000 students who weren’t. They may have been sympathetic, but many just wanted to stay out of the line of fire and survive this difficult period. Others devoted efforts to serving students in a time of crisis. Some of those worked at WIDB.
